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Introduction
In the past thirty years, information technology has in many different ways
changed how we conduct our daily tasks and how our society functions. From individuals
shopping and communicating with their friends online to the government monitoring
epidemic outbreaks and tracking down criminals for security purposes, it has made both
our lives and the government’s jobs easier.1 With the growth of technology, however,
also comes with the concerns of individual privacy. While technology makes the state
more powerful, proliferation of records and data has led to the decrease of protection
over individual privacy.2 Should and can we still maintain a balance between individuals
and the state in the era of technology, and if yes, how should we do it? In this paper, I
claim that privacy is still essential to our society as an individual, social and democratic
value, and we need a balance between privacy and surveillance in the Information Age.
As modern technology has rapidly grown out of existing legal framework and empowered
states with more capability and information superiority, the balance has been shifted and
unique challenges have been brought into the debate. To restore the balance – so as to
protect individual rights and democratic values – requires a combination of legal, social
and technological efforts.
In section one, I plan to examine the concept of surveillance and its role in
facilitating governance. I will then move on to the other side of the argument – privacy
– to examine the value of privacy and why we need a balance between it and surveillant
governance. In section three, I will give a historical overview of how the balance between
individual privacy and governance was challenged and maintained through the past
century and what lessons we could learn from it. I will then examine what is so special
about the Information Age, which parts of the privacy-surveillance debate has changed or
not changed, and what unique challenges we face today to restore the balance. Lastly, I will
present possible solutions to address each of the challenges and call for a combination of
social, technological and legal initiatives to protect privacy.
Section One: The Role of Surveillance in Governance
Surveillance is helpful to governments in many ways: it allows them to gather
more information and exercise more control, which is necessary for governments to fulfill
their roles considering the increasing mobility and anonymity of modern society. However,
unchecked surveillance that causes discrimination and inequality can also undermine a
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democratic society.3 What is the definition of surveillance, and how has it grown into a
significant part of our social life? How might surveillance facilitate governance, and when
is it considered undemocratic? This section attempts to address the above questions.
What is Surveillance?
Before discussing the more modern practices, it is necessary to examine some
of the early theoretical framework on surveillance to better understand why the human
society needs it and how it achieves its goals. Although activities of surveillance can be
traced back to early stages of history, larger scale surveillance that we understand today, as
an institutionally central and pervasive feature of social life, did not emerge until modern
time.4 Starting from social control in the workplace, surveillance is defined as a form of
bureaucratic management that makes uses of knowledge and discipline by Max Weber, the
best known figure of early analysis of surveillance.5 This understanding of surveillance
was later expanded to the broader context of society and governmental institutions by
Michel Foucault’s discussion of Bentham’s Panopticon, a circular institutional design to
observe and control prisoners with one single watchman in the center.6 Foucault argues
that surveillance system such as the Panopticon can create a self-policing apparatus to
maintain social order with minimum governing effort. Today, the concept of surveillance
becomes more sophisticated: as defined by Torin Monahan, a system of surveillance is one
that “[enables] control of people through the identification, tracking, monitoring, and/or
analysis of individuals, data, or systems”.7 However, early theories by Weber and Foucault
still apply: surveillance, as a management system based on knowledge, will always strive
for collecting more information in order to function better, and it still exists to serve the
same role of imposing social control – which Monahan considers central to understanding
surveillance – to “[order] society through the regulation of individual or group behavior”.8
These two important characteristics of surveillance remain true over time, and have even
grown more prominent as the society becomes more modern.
The Rise of Surveillance in Modern Society
Why, then, was modern society facing a greater and greater need for such a system
of institutionalized social control to manage business and governance? The answer comes
from two aspects: the changing economic and the social structures.
In the economic aspect, capitalism has introduced new business practices in the
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work environment.9 Based on Karl Marx’s description of capitalism and Max Weber’s notion
of capitalist bureaucracy, David Lyon points out that modern surveillance originates from
the emergence of large-scale business enterprises and their need to monitor and supervise
their employees to enhance efficiency.10 The new workplace relationship model caused many
business owners to abandon previous administrative approaches no longer suitable for largescale production and instead depend on the role of knowledge and well-measured information
in generating and maintaining power in the workplace.11 Surveillance came into place to serve
the need of business administration required for capitalistic economy as an approach to manage
at-scale workforce by collecting and maintaining relevant information.12
Surveillance has later grown into a more general governing technique in political
arena as governments started to face similar needs of massive control due to increasing
anonymity from urbanization and the growth of human society.13 Before modern era,
individuals mostly lived in small rural villages where familial bonds are usually shared
and everyone knew and was known by everyone. (tense)14 As human gatherings scales
from towns to cities and even to countries, social order could no longer be maintained
by previous bonds and tribal arrangement, because residents are now surrounded by
strangers. With increased anonymity and mobility, massive surveillance by government
institutions became necessary to guarantee security and order in modern society at a much
larger scale.15 As Haggerty and Ericson describes it, these practices mark “the progressive
disappearance of disappearance,” to make it difficult for individuals to remain anonymous
or to escape social monitoring without losing their social benefits.16
How is Surveillance helpful in Governance?
After we have established that surveillance systems emerged in response to the
increasing dependences on information for social control in modern society, we can see a
simple reason why governments always push for maximizing surveillance and information
gathering – more information makes their job easier from an administrative perspective.
When properly used not against the society but to better serve it, surveillance means that
government can fulfill their duty better with more information. After all, governments exist
to collectively address real issues beyond individual levels such as negative externalities,
public safety and regulations, and we want them to function well. One significant
achievement of surveillance is public health surveillance efforts to control epidemic
outbreaks. By tracking and monitoring clinical reports on spreading diseases, surveillance
allows the government to take actions to prevent further harm of the society. Another
perhaps more important function is to identify threats and maintain social order.
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Surveillance practices such as CCTV cameras on the street and airport security
screening allows law enforcement agency to function and to protect members of the society
from criminal activities and other security concerns.17 As Haggerty and Samatas argue,
very few would claim that wire taps, informants, undercover work and other comparable
practices should be abandoned all together, because they are required in today’s police
work against complex criminal organizations.18 In this sense, some degrees of surveillance
is a key component for a functioning liberal society to prosper. Although surveillance as
a form of social control has usually been criticized as negatively associated with coercion
and discrimination, proper surveillance is not only necessary but also inevitable to a
well-functioning government.19 In order to fulfill its duty of protecting national security,
regulating illegal activities, and managing the population in a large scale, government
needs to gather some information to make the correct decision and to administrate.
On the other hand, however, it should also be noted that surveillance can result
in unfavorable situations where the administration abuses their power of surveillance to
facilitate their own agenda. Throughout the twentieth century, surveillance has long been
associated with totalitarian regime that controls every aspect of its society to maintain its
ruling status, such as Eastern Germany’s uses of secret police Stasi to gather information
about any potential dissidents.20 Even in the United States, the FBI has notoriously pushes
its limits under J. Edgar Hoover to gather information at their discretion, which ended
up in harassment of civil rights activists and politicians.21 Surveillance could cause great
problems without limits or oversights, and has to be exercised within certain standards.
Democratic vs. Undemocratic Surveillance
Since surveillance can enable the government to better serve the society when
used properly, but harm individual rights when abused, it is important to evaluate what
form of surveillance or social control is more democratic, and what standard should we
use to decide it.
There are two ways of evaluating whether we consider a surveillance system
democratic. The first and weaker one is whether the system is used for democratic ends:
for example, surveillance by Stasi in East Germany and other totalitarian regimes is often
used as abuse of power for personal agenda and thus clearly not democratic.22 The second
one is more concerned with the design and process of the system, even for a democratic
government, such as surveillance programs set up by the National Security Agency (NSA)
in the United States.23 As Monahan proposes, we should evaluate a surveillance system
based on whether it promotes democratic and egalitarian participation.24 He claims that
a system is democratic when it invites participation, facilitates learning, and achieves
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some degrees of power equalization in local government or industry.25 On the other hand,
commonplace surveillance practices, though designed and exercised for democratic ends
such as care or security, have few oversights and often result in coercion and repression.26
This limitation of individual autonomy is against the principles of democratic governance,
and such surveillance should be changed.
Section Two: The Value of Privacy
As the government pushes for more surveillance to facilitate its administration,
on the other side of the debate, we also need to acknowledge that massive information
gathering by the government contains great risks of compromising individual privacy and
other democratic values when not regulated properly, even if it is useful in law enforcement
and the maintenance of social order.27 This section will first examine the concept of privacy,
identifies privacy as a social value that should not be considered against to greater social
good, and establishes privacy as a core value of democracy.
Conception of privacy
Privacy has been an important individual right and frequently referred to in
everyday life, yet it is difficult to come up with an overarching definition of privacy that is
neither too vague nor too narrow.28 Each individual has different understandings of privacy,
and it is even harder to apply various definitions into specific legal and political context.
Many scholars and jurists have attempted to conceptualize the term and develop a theory
of privacy.29 Warren and Brandeis declared privacy to be “the right to be let alone” – a
“general right to the immunity of the person, the right to one’s personality.”30 E. L. Godkin,
amongst others, proposed the limited-access theory on privacy as protection or control over
the access to the self.31 Some understand privacy as secrecy, and consider it violated when
concealed information is disclosed to the public.32 Others consider privacy a control over
personal information, under which people can determine for themselves “when, how and
to what extent information about them is communicated to others”, thus defining privacy
as a form of property.33 Seeing such difficulty in defining the term, some theorists argue
that privacy is just a derivative from other rights and thus reducible to them.34
Solove, on the other hand, argues that privacy has irreducible value in itself,
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yet there is no one core element that constitutes privacy, so the current attempts for a
unifying definition must be replaced by a more pluralistic conception.35 Privacy should
be regarded as an umbrella term that consists of many different, interconnected elements,
in order that legal framework and protection around it will function in a meaningful way
to solve the real problems. The ambiguity of the concept of privacy has been central to
many ongoing debates between privacy and governance. When governance often has
tangible claims and benefits regarding security and social order, the value of privacy can
be easily overlooked when it is defined as something insignificant or negative. One such
argument is that one has nothing to hide if one has done nothing wrong, framing the claim
of privacy as an excuse to hide wrongs. Solove addressed this argument by pointing out
that privacy is not about hiding something bad and this understanding of privacy as a form
of secrecy is myopic.36 People’s fear of violation of privacy is not so much about their
inhibited behavior, but more a sense of powerlessness and vulnerability when facing the
information superiority of the government who can make decision that will significantly
impact your life based on your possibly distorted or oversimplified personal data. Another
such argument contrasts privacy, a vague concept with no directly impactful values, with
the greater good of the society, yet this argument has mistakenly contrasted privacy with
social values, as illustrated in the next few paragraphs.
Privacy as a social value
When arguing in favor of privacy, many took the approach of rejecting the
totalitarian model that places societal good over individual rights, but inevitably still falling
in the mindset that there is a constant tradeoff between privacy and social good. 37 As an
individual right, privacy is traditionally considered as merely valuable to individuals, and
thus often compromised when in tension with the greater good of the society during war
or more generally time of insecurity. Taking a step back, I argue that protecting privacy
does not necessarily mean we are compromising the benefit of the larger society. As
each individual values privacy as a fundamental right and can only live and work well
with privacy protection, the same individual, as a social being, can only contribute to the
welfare of a society through production and social engagement when feel safe about their
privacy. 38 In this sense, privacy is also constitutive of society.39 The tradeoff mindset
that views privacy individualistically makes privacy undervalued, and protection based on
such understanding will be insufficient to make up for the real harm caused to the victims
of privacy violation. The interests privacy needs to stand up against – such as security,
free speech, efficiency and economic development – are often framed in terms of social
values, so if claims to protect privacy are limited on the individual level, they do not have
much philosophical ground in the debate. One example is the Patriot Act after the attack
35
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on September 11, 2001, that enlarges the scope of information sharing for intelligence
purposes.40 The Patriot Act was passed in an overwhelming panic over national security in
which arguments for individual privacy were easily ignored when facing security issues
involving the society as a whole, yet later became highly controversial when its implication
to privacy protection became clearer.41 As Solove argues, if privacy is always understood
as the opposite of greater societal good, it is hard for individuals to claim that their needs
for privacy trump the welfare of an entire society.42
However, privacy indeed promotes the communities we live in and protects
individuals from harm and disruptions to important social activities as well. It has a
profound impact on the power structure of society and freedom each member has. In a
more pragmatic model, privacy is valuable based on its contributions to society.43 The
harm of losing privacy on public life, creative processes, culture and freedom of speech
should all be taken into account when evaluating privacy and how much social benefits
it can bring.44 To take a step further, privacy, as a protection of individual liberty and
independence, is essential to a democratic society.
Privacy as Protection of Liberty and Core Value of Democracy
The value of privacy as to democratic society has been widely discussed by various
political philosophers. As mentioned earlier, Foucault’s analysis of the Panopticon system
shows how the deprivation of privacy under massive surveillance that imposes power and
discipline to individuals who are being watched leads to self-censorship and obedience.45
In his theoretical discussion of privacy and democracy, Joshua Cohen regards privacy as
central to democratic participation because of its protection independence of judgment.
46
Privacy rights, he argues, is essential in creating and maintaining a society of equals
and its pluralistic philosophies, and thus should be understood as expressing democracy’s
core value, as opposed to constraining such expression.47 Surveillance practices such as
FBI’s monitoring of activists and politicians under Hoover, as a real life example, greatly
discourages political participation by imposing discrimination against the principle of
equality. As John Dewey argued, that democracy is “more than a form of government,”
but also a mode of living based on social equality, long lines of race, gender, and other
categories of differences.48 In a society without privacy protection, social equality that
precedes democracy will no longer be in place.
Thus, if we accept that privacy rights are the basis for personal liberties, and
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personal liberties are constitutive in public reason in the democratic process, we should
understand why privacy rights are essential to democracy. Privacy protects two types of
interests: those that avoid disclosure of personal matters and those in making independent
judgment on important issues without interference.49 Both interests are necessary in
democratic deliberation and civic dialogue.50 Poor privacy standards in cyberspace, as
claimed by Paul Schwartz, will not only discourage participation in deliberative democracy
but also undercut the development of individual capacity for self-governance.51 If equal
participation, independent judgment and social equality in governance process are required
for democratic society, then privacy rights should be in place to protect these values.
Section Three: Historical Balancing between Privacy and Governance
Now that we have examined arguments on both sides of privacy and governance,
we see that to have both a well-functioning government and a democratic society protected
under privacy rights, there is a subtle balance between privacy and governance. Public
policy debates and initiatives in the United States over the past century have shifted the
balance back and forth: the government always pushes for more information through
surveillance, while privacy rights activists fight back to protect against a totalitarian style
of governance. In this section, I will present a historical overview of institutions and legal
frameworks set up by the administrative, judiciary and legislative branches in response to
historical events and technological development.
Hoover’s FBI, Katz v. US, and Church Committee
Since governance and law enforcement are easier with information superiority
over the population,52 privacy could be easily compromised without legal protection when
governmental agencies pushed for greater surveillance and more information during the
time of need. As Fourth Amendment was considered inapplicable to wiretapping at the
time according to Olmstead v. United States, and statutes inhibiting wiretapping was
largely ineffective, surveillance through wiretapping was widely used during World War
II and the Cold War for intelligence purposes.53 As mentioned earlier, FBI under Hoover
bugged and tapped not only potential threats to national security, but also dissidents,
justices, professors, writers and scientists.54 The balance between privacy and governance
was broken, with the government abusing their power of surveillance for excessive control
and personal agenda.
Fortunately, fights to restore the balance come from all three branches of
government in the next few decades. Katz v. United States in 1967 overruled Olmstead and
49
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established the “reasonable expectation test” for the scope of Fourth Amendment protection,
laying the groundwork for further legislation to regulate electronic surveillance.55 After
Nixon’s abuses of surveillance during Watergate Scandal, Congress also realized the need
to examine government agencies and thus dedicated an eleven-member special committee
led by Senator Frank Church on the issue of surveillance. Known as the Church Committee,
this committee showed with fourteen volumes of reports and supporting documents
that the abuses of surveillance conducted by the government has been excessive.56 In
response to reports published by Church Committee, Attorney General also regulated FBI
investigations with a set of guidelines, and the FBI itself underwent major reforms to avoid
further abuses of power.57 Although increased surveillance granted the government more
power for a few decades, it later received hostile responses from the population, and the
respect of privacy was restored. However, this balance was soon challenged again by the
growing technology.
Stored Communication Act (1986)
As technology advanced, earlier legal principles that protected individual privacy
can no longer provide adequate guidance due to its vagueness and inapplicability to the new
context. Under such circumstances, Stored Communication Act of 1986 was introduced
to restore the guidance on privacy protection. Katz v. United States has established that
Fourth Amendment should protect individuals’ rights when the government violates their
reasonable expectation of privacy, yet the test has become more ambiguous in the context
of new technologies such as emailing, and the protection from the constitution is much
weaker when applied to online information held by a third party.58 To address such issues,
the Stored Communications Act (SCA) came into place to provide privacy protection for
stored wire and electronic communications held by third party internet service providers
such as emails.59 Under the SCA, the government has limited power to require internet
service providers to reveal metadata on information not related to content, thus protecting
privacy of the owners of these data.60 The SCA was a great example of how legal framework
for privacy protection should evolve accordingly with new technology, yet also later shows
how fast it could become outdated.
CALEA (1994 – expansion in 2004)
While efforts to restore privacy protection moved forward, the government also
tried to push for more convenience to obtain information from third parties by enacting
policies favoring the surveillance side of the debate. In 1994, the Communication Assistance
for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) was passed to force telephone companies to redesign
their network architectures to ease law enforcement’s need of wiretapping digital telephone
55
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calls.61 The act was originally adopted based on FBI’s concern that it would be impossible
to conduct any surveillance with an upgraded design of phone switches, but was expanded
to cover internet service providers and communication services like Skype in 2005.62 A few
years later, FBI is pushing to expand CALEA to all online communications software, as
part of many efforts that law enforcement agencies try to control more online data.
Today, new computer technology seems to have created a new arena between
privacy and governance; fights to maintain the balance between privacy and governance
have only intensified.63
Section Four: Break of Balance in Information Age
The tension between privacy and surveillance is nothing new, yet under today’s
new technology and the government’s cooperation with large players in the private sector,
state surveillance has become immune to some of the traditional limits. Have the styles
of governance that we rejected still living in the same way, in the same form, but just less
explicit through the use of technology? This section aims to answer these questions by
examining which parts of the debate have not changed in today’s context, while which
ones have. I will then further argue that the changed parts of the debate have tipped off the
balance favorably towards the government side and posed unique challenges that need to
be addressed with new solutions.
Parts of the Debate that have not Changed
In the public discourse on privacy and surveillance nowadays, we can still hear
a lot of familiar arguments such as “you have nothing to hide in your email if you did not
do anything wrong,” “there is no point of caring about privacy on the internet,” or “law
enforcement needs to collect all the traffic in order to catch cyber thieves.” Although the
context of these arguments changed from CCTV camera recording and wiretapping to the
internet and computers, they are intrinsically the same as the old arguments and can thus
be easily addressed by the framework of privacy rights established before.64
There are three parts of the debate that have not changed. The first is the question
on the value of privacy. Although it has been increasingly difficult for individuals to protect
their privacy as they rely more on third-party technology to store, send and receive personal
data, it does not mean that they no longer care about the control over these data. No matter
how the platform on which potential privacy violation occurs has changed, privacy still
shares the same philosophical values both on individual and social levels.65 Privacy rights
still promote values liberty and independence of judgment that are essential to democratic
society, and, prescriptively speaking, should thus be cared about and protected even on the
internet.
61
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The second is the function of surveillance and its role in governance. In order
to fulfill their duty, governments need data to govern the modern society and combat
sophisticated criminal networks at large scale, and some degrees of surveillance is
necessary.66 Surveillance serves the same function of making administration easier, not
matter by using paroling, wiretapping, security cameras, or big data analysis.67 As Lessig
argues, liberty online will not come from the absence of state, but a state of a certain kind,
as anywhere else.68 Data collection to catch cyber criminals, serving the same roles in
governance as search and seize to find thieves, should thus be authorized under the same
amount of scrutiny, not bypassing existing legal principles as an exception.
The last one is whether privacy and security is an all-or-nothing tradeoff. Solove
argued against the all-or-nothing fallacy by showing that we are not making a choice
between security and nothing, but between security with oversight and regulation and
security at the sole discretion of governmental officials.69 In this sense, the privacy-security
debate in the context of the internet still needs to maintain a balance as before, and this
should be the aim of public policy design.
The unchanged parts of the debate, which primarily deal with prescriptive
grounds, could be addressed by the same theoretical framework we established earlier.70
There still are values to both privacy rights and appropriate surveillance, and a balance
can and should be struck and maintained between them.71 Other parts of the debate have
nevertheless changed in the new context and thus are more challenging to respond to.
Parts of the Debate that have Changed
What is more challenging, however, is the part of the debate that has indeed
changed in the Information Age and thus presents new challenges that could not be
addressed by the traditional theoretical discussion on privacy. There are mainly five
issues about surveillance practices over computer technology that need to be examined
specifically.
The first one is people’s expectation of and general social norm of privacy on
the internet. Although the conception of privacy has always been diverse, it was easier to
reach a consensus before as people have physical control over their private information.
The social norm was relatively clear that people should have privacy rights to prevent
others from entering into their house or reading their letters, at least not with a warrant or
other probable cause, if they do not wish so, and such expectation of privacy was more
commonly shared and less ambiguous. Today, however, with information recorded and
transmitted, and data centers and mail transfer servers located far beyond our reach, it is
66
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more difficult for us to reach a clear consensus on what we expect to be private.72 As Paul
Schwartz puts it, there is an absence of appropriate and enforceable privacy norms that
prevent traditional privacy law to effectively function in cases regarding modern computer
technology.73
The second one is decreased transparency and reduced participation caused
by surveillance technology. As Justice Sotomayor points out, one natural limitation of
conventional surveillance is the community hostility when they notice increased policing
activities.74 Before, surveillance are usually visible to those who are watched, which will
result in more awareness and advocacies to maintain the balance if it moves too much
towards governance from individual rights, thus incorporating public participation into
the system. New technologies, however, are often designed with an exclusionary nature
and less visible to the community, thus reducing the previous check on surveillance from
the community.75 Analysts in law enforcement office today can process data they collected
from security camera or online traffic without paroling on the street and being seen by
members of society. To make it worse, opaque algorithms make it more difficult for
individuals to know what data have been saved, gathered and sent when they interact with
computer software or mobile apps and thus unaware of the potential privacy implications.
The third challenge, similarly, is the elimination of man power limits that gives
government larger capability. In the same court opinion, Justice Sotomayor argues that
modern surveillance technology has also reduced the traditional limits of costs and man
power.76 She used the example of GPS monitoring the track down a person’s movement,
which has much lower cost compared to conventional techniques that use extensive man
power, and has thus evades the checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices.77
One other example is use of license plate reader by the NSA to track down automobile
movements, which allows the computer to process and classify information much faster
than having policemen following each car on the street. In both cases, the government can
now use limited police resources to gather a substantial quantum of intimate information,
and this, as Sotomayor argues, may “alter the relationship between citizen and government
in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”78
Fourthly, the legal framework governing surveillance has long been outdated
and easily outpaced by the fast growing technology. As past regulations that constrains
government’s power only covers existing technology at the time, cases based on new
technology has to rely on updated legislation or is open to judiciary interpretation. As
shown in the last section, Stored Communication Act of 1986 attempts to offer Fourth72
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Amendment-like privacy protection for digital communications stored online and has been
effective for some periods of time, yet soon fails to accommodate new service model
on the internet.79 As SCA differentiates between electronic communications server –
unopened email within 180 days – and remote computing service – emails over 180 days
and stored purely for the purpose of providing storage or computer processing services, it
only requires a search warrant for the former, while a much lower requirement is applied
to the latter.80 This means SCA cannot provide as much protection as we would hope
today, when most emails are stored on the server and cloud computing has become a new
lifestyle. The lack of legislative progress on internet privacy since SCA has been highly
incompatible with the acceleration of the technology industry, yet further shows the issue
of outdated legal framework in the debate.
Lastly, we rely much more on third party private enterprises, and surveillance
involves increasing public and private collaboration. As people spend more and more of
their interaction and social life via third party platforms – websites, mobile phones, etc –
government starts to collect data and conduct surveillance with close collaboration with
private enterprises.81 As Lessig argues, in the age of the internet, the government’s power
comes not just from chips but from a government-commerce alliance.82 As commerce fares
better with a well-regulated society, it will supply government with the resources to build
up stronger regulation and control, through direct and indirect means.83 What protection do
we then have, when our private information is stored and controlled by third party actors
who might turn over our data to the government? Far fewer than what we used to have.
Break of Balance by the New Challenges
With technological advancement and its unique characteristics, the internet and
new surveillance techniques have tipped the balance between privacy and governance
favorably towards the government side. Although technology becomes a more important
part in human interaction in everyday life and individuals have become more connected,
the understanding of privacy protection seems to still lag in the past tense. The approach of
assuming no privacy expectation when information is disclosed to a third party, as Justice
Sotomayor argues, is ill suited to the digital age, where mundane tasks like dialing to the
cellular providers, visiting URLs and purchasing groceries and medications online are all
carried out through third parties.84 It is now much more difficult to reach a consensus on
79
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the reasonable expectation of privacy, which results in a significant weakening of Fourth
Amendment and the lack of other legal framework to protect privacy.85 Dependence on
third party private enterprises in social interaction and the lack of legal protection for
such interactions have made individuals more vulnerable under surveillance practices by
the government in collaboration with the private sector. While protections of individuals
become weaker, the government, on the other hand, has become strong as empowered by
technology.86 Throughout the past century, the government has expanded its governance
techniques to protect security. In the past, law enforcement relies mostly on searching
houses, people and documents, while now they have more tools for information gathering
from collecting records and data, conducting audio and visual surveillance, tracking
movement and other big data analysis.87 Conventional constrains, such as community
hostility and policing resources, have diminished as new technology makes aggregation
of information cheaper and less transparent. Information superiority has made the
government more powerful, while leaving the individuals few tools to counterbalance the
power structure. These special aspects of computer technology has broken the balance
between individuals and the government, and must be addressed with new responses.
Section Five: Responses to New Challenges to Restore the Balance
The balance between privacy and governance needs to be restored and maintained,
yet the new technological environment has imposed new challenges. This section propose
potential solutions to each of the unique challenges from last section under the context
of fast growing technology. I would like to claim that in order to maintain strong privacy
protection against abuse of power and unreasonable surveillance, we need a combination
of public campaigns, legal reforms and institutions, and technological designs that are
more democratic with contributions from private companies.
The first challenge we are facing is the diverging conception of online privacy. A
big problem that needs to be addressed is simply that there have been enough discussions
and awareness by the general public. A large part of the population have never considered
whether their expectation of privacy online matches up with how much privacy they
actually have under current government surveillance, and are thus missed out in this debate
of understanding privacy. While some might consider that there is a tradeoff of privacy for
convenience and thinks it is inevitable to expect no privacy on the internet, it is unlikely
that most people would simply give up legal protection and accept warrantless disclosure
to the government of their browsing history.88 One solution, therefore, is to increase public
awareness of what we should reasonably expect for our online behavior as an individual
who values privacy, and stand up to fight against incidents when such expected privacy is
violated. It is much easier to make progress in bridging this diversion when we have more
people joining the conversation and contributing to the debate.
The second challenge is the decreased transparency because surveillance
technology now requires more technical knowledge to understand and thus less
85
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straightforward to allow public participation. One solution to this is better media coverage
of technology and increased technical education. When the general public is more educated
about what implications each surveillance technology has, they can make more informed
decision and observation on what the government can do. For example, an individual might
not have understood what NSA’s license plate reader can do, but after reading an article
that specifies how this technology allows NSA to track the movement of each automobile
owner, there will be more public discussion on whether the use of such technology is
appropriate. Similarly, better technical education can allow individuals to understand how
one software product leaves less room for government surveillance than another, and thus
make informed decision on which one to purchase. Admittedly, this solution might not be
practical to implement, but does provide a possibility of restoring the balance. Another
solution is Monahan and Lessig’s call for democratic surveillance as incorporated in the
design of technology.89 Certain technological design will make it harder for the government
to install a backdoor without harming the overall security of the technology, therefore
preventing undemocratic abuse of power on the design level.90 Although the public is
usually excluded from participation in technical issues like telephone line design and
communication network, there are ways to make the use of a technology more transparent
and thus encourage public supervision.91
The third challenge is the diminishing limit of surveillance man power. New
technology has made massive surveillance cheaper, therefore granting the government
more power to collect information with little additional cost. The solution I want to propose
here, however, is not a technical one but a political or legal one. It is true that computer
technology has transformed a lot of ways how government gather information, yet there
are few ways to force technology to go backward in time. Technology will keep advancing
through different generations, but it is ultimate just a tool and depends on how people are
allowed to use it. What really matters is not how efficient technologies are, but whether
they are used with regulations and oversights.
Consider computers as another form of man power. It would have made Stasi in
East Germany and Hoover’s FBI more powerful, but what these agencies did, no matter
using man power or technology, should not have been allowed in the first place. What is at
stake here is whether governmental agencies should be allowed to massively collect data,
not how efficient they did it. For example, wiretapping has also greatly reduced man power
required for surveillance when it first emerged, but once there is oversight from Congress by
the Church Committee, the use of it can be regulated with proper administrative guideline
and legal framework.92 I argue that computer technology is merely a more advanced
version of electronic surveillance, and thus the solution is to regulate it with oversight
under an established political and legal framework, which leads us to our fourth challenge.
The fourth problem to address is the soon-outdated legal framework compared
to the fast-growing technologies. One problem with most past technology regulations and
statutes that refrain governmental power is that they only protect privacy rights in specific
ways of social interaction and were built closely with existing technology at the time when
89
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they were passed, without enough flexibility to accommodate technological evolution.
Therefore, as new technology emerges, the decision of whether the new issue still falls
under the old framework is passed to courts, and an updated version of the regulations is
generally needed for the emerging technology. For example, when telephone and early POPprotocoled email first became popular in society, it soon became clear that existing legal
frameworks were insufficient to regulate surveillance over these technologies, so CALEA
and SCA were established respectively in response to each technological advancement.
However, as cloud computing and email storage enters into the mainstream, SCA has
also become outdated in regulating remote computing services, and new legislative and
judiciary efforts become necessary.93
It is worth noting that the fact that outdated legal framework has not been effective
in protecting privacy does not mean we should give up on legal protections all together.
Particularly, some who are disappointed at protection of privacy by the current legal system
took the approach of Crypto-Anarchy – a belief that strong cryptography to keep all their
online communication encrypted from the government is the best way to protect their
privacy and political freedom.94 This approach can successfully ensure privacy, but will
also abandon any role we want the government to fulfill. Referring to the earlier section
on the role of surveillance and governance, there is a reason why governments exist and
there are duties we want them to fulfill with certain technology, including regulating the
cyberspace.95 The law that governs cyberspace might be outdated and ineffective, but is
still necessary and beneficial.
How, then, can we ensure that legal reforms can catch up with the speed of
technological advancement? One lesson to learn from SCA is that the law needs to be
designed with more flexibility while jointly considering how legislative and judiciary
efforts interact.96 As Solove argues, this problem of technology and law cannot be solved
by one-sidedly favoring legislatures over courts or vice versa.97 On the legislature side,
we need to have laws that are sufficiently broad and flexible to accommodate the rapid
speed of technological growth. However, such breadth and flexibility must be carefully
interpreted on the judiciary side to avoid vagueness and to be enforceable as intended.98
Internet privacy scholars have suggested different principles for the framework to regulate
evolving technology. Solove for one argues that we should regulate information gathering
by the government when it causes “problems of reasonable significance”, and proposed
three principles: minimization of data gathering and use and deletion after a reasonable
period of time, gathering under particularized suspicions, and proper oversight.99
The last challenge is the increasing dependence on third party and the collaboration
between government and commerce in the Information Age. While legal reforms as
mentioned in the last few paragraphs can for sure refrain government from requesting
93
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customer data from or installing a backdoor at private enterprises, to restore the balance
and protect privacy rights, we have to go beyond the laws to social norms and even to
computer code itself.
In his book Order Without Law, Robert Ellickson discusses how people more
often apply informal societal norms than formal legal rules in resolving disputes.100
A society’s operative norms that involves enforcement activity – such as rewards and
punishments – exercises stronger social control on the population101. This theory presents
a pragmatic approach of promoting privacy through norms: if privacy protection in new
technology becomes part of the expected social norms, companies are bound to include
it not because of legal requirements but because corresponding rewards and punishments
will be enforced on them by the society and the market. For example, companies failing
to protect privacy will lead to the punishment of the loss of customers and hostility from
the technology community as imposed by the society. In the meanwhile, companies that
do value privacy will have a competitive advantage in the market, and such practices
will therefore be further promoted. In this sense, the protection of privacy can be better
addressed not by formal laws but by social norms that bind the technology industry.
Furthermore, these norms are also implemented deeply into the technology
itself. As Lessig argues, cyberspace requires a broader term of “regulation”, beyond the
traditional lawyer’s scope, by computer code.102 Code decides how and what digital objects
and information can be accessed by whom, and we can make design decisions to regulate
cyberspace while we build software and architecture in it.103 It is true that although the
application of technology is often seen as political, its design is traditionally considered
apolitical and motivated by the free-market.104 However, technological design has a
significant role in political pursuit of privacy and liberty as well.105 As Neil Richards points
out, how much privacy and civil liberties we have today depend largely on business and
engineering decisions by those companies who made the software. In order for the society
to exercise civil liberties and protect their privacy, we need to have technologists and
engineers who value free speech and intellectual privacy as part of their professional ethics
and build them into the system in their design.106 Monahan considers the current popularity
of open-source software as an opportunity to move in the direction of democratization
of technology, yet more broadly speaking, technologies as intermediates like ISP, email
provider, telephone network and social media sites are the institutions through which we
100
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speak, and their incorporation of democratic architectures can have a huge impact on
public participation.107 The fight to restore the balance is not only for users and activists,
but also substantially for technology companies. A solution to the challenges presented by
the Information Age should include not only legal code – the East Coast code – but also
computer code – the West Coast code.
Conclusion
As modern technology develops rapidly and becomes a more important aspect of
society, it has also created an imbalance between privacy and governance by empowering
states with information superiority while weakening traditional protection of individual
privacy. The balance between privacy and surveillance has been heavily debated over
the past century with a lot of public policy initiatives and legal proposals. There are
merits to both sides of the argument: on one hand, institutionalized surveillance, as a
theoretical concept of control widely discussed in contemporary political philosophy and
closely associated with arrangements of modern and capitalist social structure, facilitates
governance and is necessary for a well-functioning government; on the other, privacy
rights, though hard to define with a unifying notion, has a lot of individual and social values
and must be protected against abuse of power to ensure independent judgment and equality
essential to a democratic society. In the past few decades, privacy protections have been
constantly challenged by the government’s push for more information and control such
as wiretapping and other intelligence practices under Hoover, but a series of legislative,
judiciary and administrative efforts such as SCA, Katz v. United States, and guideline of
FBI by the Attorney general were also passed to strike the balance.
Entering into the Information Age, some parts – the value of privacy, function
of surveillance and how significant is the tradeoff – of the debate between privacy and
surveillance remain unchanged, while others are fundamentally altered by the new computer
technology. What is a reasonable expectation of privacy online becomes more ambiguous;
efficient and cheap surveillance techniques has caused the traditional limits of man power
and community hostility on overboard surveillance to diminish, thus reducing the checks
on government power; legal frameworks are too outpaced by the speed of technological
growth to provide the protections as before; reliance on third party in everyday life and
collaboration between government and these third parties have made individuals more
vulnerable to surveillance.
These new challenges must be addressed with new solutions. Raising public
awareness on the state of privacy on the internet will encourage more conversations to
form a new social norm, and increasing media coverage and technical education will also
make the population more informed on technological surveillance and how to protect
their privacy. Moreover, a more flexible legal framework that can accommodate evolving
technology while remains enforceable requires efforts from both the legislatures and
courts. Lastly and most importantly, we have to look beyond laws to societal norms –
beyond legal code to technical code – for a more democratic cyberspace, as a large part of
our civil liberties and privacy depends on the social norms in technology industry and the
design of software and computer architecture by engineers in the technology companies.
To maintain the balance between privacy and governance in a digital age, we need a joint
efforts from social, legal and technical aspects for a better cyberspace.
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